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ABSTRACT 
This study develops a model of collaboration choice among city governments.  The 
theoretical model suggests that collaboration is a function of transaction costs that vary with 
different institutional arrangements utilized in cities, as well as the degree of competition 
between cities.  This study argues that cities facing high transaction costs and high competition 
are less likely to participate in collaboration and to participate less deeply.  Underlying these 
environmental factors are resource factors that create incentives for cities to collaborate for 
efficiency gains, which affect both the decision to collaborate and the depth of collaboration.  
Hypotheses are tested to explain why cities choose to participate in collaboration in the first 
stage of the analysis and how deeply they collaborate in the second stage.  Utilizing a Heckman 
model of this two-stage process, we find broad support for a number of variables that measure 
each of these theoretical constructs. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over roughly the last decade, a growing number of scholars have documented a variety 
of collaborative mechanisms that city governments utilize to formulate and implement public 
policy.  These interactions can take many forms, from relatively simple joint service agreements 
for fire service to complex, ongoing interactions involving multiple implementation decision 
points and actual exchange of financial resources.  For example, studies of collaborative network 
behavior measure the number and type of contacts within a network to evaluate outcome 
effectiveness.  Examples from research on economic development policy (Agranoff and 
McGuire 1998, Agranoff and McGuire 2001, Agranoff and McGuire 2003, McGuire 1999, 
McGuire et al. 1994), education policy (Meier and O'Toole 2002, O'Toole and Meier 1999, 
O'Toole and Meier 2003, O'Toole, Meier, and Nicholson-Crotty 2003), and mental health 
networks (Milward and Provan 1998a, Milward and Provan 1998b, Milward and Provan 1999, 
Milward, Provan, and Else 1993, Provan and Milward 1995) are noteworthy examples.   
Interlocal agreements have been studied as part of intergovernmental relations for some 
time.  Although such collaboration is seemingly ubiquitous among cities, research has only 
recently begun to demonstrate that administering policy interlocally is much different – and 
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substantially more difficult – than traditional, agency-centered, top-down management.  
However, the existing research rarely speaks to the question of why governments choose to 
collaborate rather than go it alone.  In this regard, the processes occurring in such complex 
governing arrangements as interlocal collaboration, characterized as they are by multiple 
agencies without a formal hierarchy, can be viewed as collective – political – choices, in addition 
to a purely management tool. 
This study presents a model of collaboration choice focusing on the exchange of 
interlocal financial resources.  The model is tested on a dataset of 2,825 cities across the United 
States using two variants of the Heckman technique for estimating models.  We utilize the 
amount of interlocal dollars received by cities as the measure of collaboration, whereby the first 
stage of the decision process – choosing to collaborate – can be operationalized as whether or not 
dollars are received.  In the second stage, the degree of collaboration is measured by the amount 
of dollars received.  Thus, the dependent variables in the model are, first, the binary choice of 
whether or not to collaborate and, second, the degree of collaboration, measured as dollars 
transferred from one city to another. 
Interlocal collaboration requires substantial incentives to overcome the difficulties and 
loss of policy autonomy associated with coordinated implementation in a more pluralistic policy 
environment.  If the motivation to generate slack resources is omnipresent, as Niskanen (1971) 
suggests, and if the opportunities to acquire resources through collaboration exist, why is there so 
much variability in the use of collaboration as a policy making and administration tool?  This 
variability of collaborative behavior across cities suggests that the choice to collaborate is more 
complex than a focus on the underlying motivation to generate slack resources implies; the 
choice to collaborate (or not) does not occur in a vacuum.  Environmental attributes alter the 
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payoff structures potential collaborators face, changing their preferences for collaboration.  
While myriad factors might be considered as potentially impacting collaboration choice, three 
are important:  institutional arrangements and the transaction costs associated with them, 
interlocal competition, and the underlying motivation to reap slack resources. 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Coase’s (1937) work marked the beginning of the recognition of the role of transaction 
costs in the theory of the firm, and the extension of these ideas to other forms of institutional 
governance.  In this framework, firms are viewed as governance structures rather than as mere 
production-distribution entities.  Williamson’s reinvigoration of the transaction cost approach 
made the material approachable for political science.  For Williamson, transaction costs can be 
defined as the “comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under 
alternative governance structures” (1989, 142).  In other words, the costs of striking a deal vary, 
depending on the institutions in place.  Some institutions create more costs for deal making than 
others.  Political scientists and economists have applied this approach to governance institutions.  
They have utilized this approach to describe a variety of political phenomena, from the 
Congressional-bureaucratic relations, to regulatory policy, and to the development of majority 
voting blocks in European parliaments (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987, Baron 1991, Dixit 1996, 
Epstein and O'Halloran 1994, Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, Shepsle 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 
1987). 
While the research on institutions generally has been prolific in recent years, the 
application of these ideas to collaborative behavior is mostly absent.  Although rarely 
conceptualized this way (see Milward and Provan 1998b for an interesting exception), interlocal 
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collaborative settings themselves can be conceptualized as institutions created to help reduce the 
transaction costs associated with collaborative policy making and implementation operating at 
the collective choice level, using Ostrom’s (1999) taxonomy of institution types. 
Constitution-level institutions -- charters at the municipal level -- may alter the decision 
processes at the collective choice level, but what city-charter level institutions might matter?  
This study suggests that at a minimum, three institutions matter most:  city manager versus other 
forms of government, at-large versus single-member (ward) district representation, and partisan 
versus non-partisan elections.  Since the reform era, these institutions have been center stage in 
the debate about the best way to organize municipal governments.  In their study of the city 
manager form, Feiock, Jeong and Kim (2003, 617) point out that:  “The form of government 
embedded in the city charter operates as a constitutional contract.”  The reform structures of the 
city manager form of government, at-large district representation, and non-partisan elections 
potentially have interesting and non-obvious impacts on collaboration decisions. 
It is useful to consider how each institution may aid city governments in reducing the 
transaction costs normally associated with collaborative policy implementation.  First, interlocal 
collaboration represents more inclusive methods for deciding the details of producing and 
delivering public goods and services.  This more inclusive mode potentially provides an 
opportunity for rent-seeking behavior on the part collaborative partners.  City managers, who 
have established norms of professional conduct and careers that are less directly tied to the 
outcomes of any given election, can make credible commitments to block such behaviors in a 
pluralistic setting (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003, Feiock and Kim 2000).  Mayors acting as chief 
executives and city council members, who rely on the financial and electoral support of various 
interests, can less successfully commit to resisting such rent-seeking behavior.  Thus, the city 
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manager form, suited as it is to balancing and filtering numerous interests, can reduce the 
transaction costs of rent-seeking that potentially exist in networks of collaborators. 
Second, single-member districts motivate politicians to focus on narrow interests (Kettl 
2002).  At-large districts, alternatively, curb parochialism by creating an incentive structure that 
motivates politicians to focus on services to the majority.  Cities organized to support the more 
pluralistic method of policymaking associated with single-member districts must institutionalize 
mechanisms for negotiation and deal-making in the policy making and implementation process.  
Such mechanisms would reduce the transaction costs associated with collaboration in a 
pluralistic network structure. 
Third, in non-partisan elections, a transaction cost approach suggests that they have little 
impact on the choice to collaborate.  Parties help reduce the transaction costs associated with 
voters gathering information on candidate policy positions.  Non-partisan elections, then, make 
such information gathering more costly.  However, this information costs explanation has no 
implications for how motivations to collaborate might be altered under partisan or non-partisan 
institutional arrangements.   
The institutional arrangements associated with city government structure represent the ex 
ante variation in political transaction costs.  But ex post costs also must be considered.  One of 
the most important costs of managing an agreement or transaction is monitoring.  Any agreement 
must be monitored in some way to ensure ongoing compliance with the terms of the agreement.  
This monitoring can be done informally by administrators who are working on the project or it 
can be done formally through a program audit process.  Because monitoring can be costly and 
because that cost is not a part of the production cost of the agreement, it represents a transaction 
cost.   
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Monitoring requires resources in the form of personnel – accountants, lawyers, and other 
staff – but ultimately, it requires information on the compliance of the collaborators.  Gathering 
information on compliance can often require reviews not only of operational functions, but 
detailed analyses of financial records.  And when disputes arise between collaborators, 
negotiations must be organized to settle them.  All of which, of course, drives up the cost of 
acquiring and using information.  As North (1990, 27) suggests: “The costliness of information is 
the key to the costs of transacting, which consist of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes 
of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing 
agreements.” 
Thus, a transaction costs theory of collaboration must utilize both ex ante and ex post 
forms of costs to sufficiently evaluate how behavior is biased by different institutional 
arrangements. 
 
INTERLOCAL COMPETITION AND LOCATIONAL FACTORS 
Researchers have found that “locational factors” – whether a city is a central city, a 
suburban city located in a metropolitan area, or a city located outside of a metropolitan area – 
affect collaborative behavior (Agranoff and McGuire 1998, Agranoff and McGuire 2003).  Some 
suggest that central cities and non-metropolitan cities are most likely to participate in 
collaboration.  Others believe that proximity breeds closer ties. 
But while the findings are intriguing, little theory has been brought to the question.  The 
work of Tiebout and colleagues (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, Tiebout 1956) could be 
utilized for this purpose.  Tiebout (1956) argues that cities compete in a market-like way to 
provide an optimal mix of goods and services at the lowest overall tax rate.  They do this because 
   
 7
they are in competition for residents and employers who are – at least at the margins – 
discriminating consumers of government service packages. 
This competition creates countervailing motivations for cities.  On the one hand, cities 
are motivated by competition to reduce costs to either provide additional services or reduce tax 
rates.  One of the ways cities can attempt to accomplish this goal is through the generation of 
slack resources made available by jointly implementing a service with another city.  On the other 
hand, cities will avoid agreements that disproportionately favor their collaboration partner.  
Why?  Because any relative gain to the collaboration partner can be used for greater 
enhancement of services or reduction of tax rates, all of which attract residents and businesses 
from one jurisdiction to another. 
Cities that provide a very similar basket of goods at similar prices (overall tax rates) and 
are in close proximity will be the most competitive.  In such cases, the total gains that each might 
receive through collaboration is less important than the relative gains one achieves more or less 
than the collaboration partner.  If one city in a collaboration can achieve more slack resources, it 
can use those resources in any number of ways to gain a comparative advantage against its 
collaborator in their competition for residents and employers.  Competition, then, creates a zero-
sum game for collaborators.   
When cities provide a different basket of goods and services and consequently serve 
different publics, the degree of competition is lower.  Lower competition for proximate cities 
creates incentives to focus on absolute gains.  Both cities gain from collaboration, and unequal 
gains are tolerated because they do not mean a potential loss of residents and employers to their 
collaboration partner.  In these situations, the game is transformed from a zero-sum game to a 
positive-sum game. 
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Cities outside of metropolitan areas present a difficult case.  On the one hand, they are 
less concerned about competition because fewer direct competitors are nearby.  But, few 
potential collaborators are nearby.  Such cities should be interested in collaboration more often, 
but the opportunities may be rarer. 
The focus on absolute and relative gains implies an interest in the degree of 
collaboration.  Competition, in this respect, is different than the institutional arrangements 
discussed above.  The transaction costs of varying institutional arrangements affect the decision 
calculus of joining a collaborative arrangement (i.e., can a deal be struck).  Competition focuses 
on the degree or depth of the collaborative arrangement.  Competitive cities are no more or less 
interested in collaboration than other cities, but deep collaboration is difficult because unequal 
gains from collaboration cannot be sustained between cities focused on relative gains issues. 
This discussion suggests a model of the environmental and institutional constraints on 
collaborative behavior depicted in Table 1.  The columns represent environments of low and 
high competition, while the rows represent generally high or low transaction costs of reaching a 
collaborative agreement.   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Transaction costs affect the propensity to enter into collaborative agreements.  Low 
transaction costs allow for easier agreement when the underlying motivations exist to pursue 
such agreements.  High transaction costs make such agreements more difficult, and we thus 
expect to find fewer agreements when transaction costs are high. 
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High competition creates a focus on the relative gains from collaboration.  Low 
competition allows cities to focus on the absolute gains from collaboration.  Because the focus is 
on the gains from collaboration, we argue that the degree of competition affects the depth of the 
collaborative agreement. 
This two-by-two matrix shows how simplified combinations of transaction costs and 
competition suggest different outcomes for collaboration.  When transaction costs are low and 
competition is low, we expect many transactions and deeper collaborative arrangements.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, when transaction costs are high and competition is high, cities will be 
less likely to collaborate and will be less likely to pursue deep collaboration because of concerns 
about relative gains.   
On the other diagonal, the institutional and competition signals are mixed and the results 
are more intriguing.  When transaction costs are high but competition is low, we expect that 
cities will want to pursue deep collaboration, but will have a difficult time doing so because the 
costs of reaching an agreement are high.  In this scenario, we would expect to find fewer 
transactions, but the ones that occur should be deep.  Alternatively, when transaction costs are 
low but competition is higher, we expect that cities will act opportunistically.  Because 
transaction costs are low, it is easy to forge an agreement.  However, a greater focus on relative 
gains makes deep collaborations problematic.  Rationally acting cities are expected to pursue 
collaborative arrangements on the chance that they may be able to gain more slack than their 
collaboration partner and thereby create a price or service-level differential between it and its 
competitor, but the collaborative arrangements will rarely be deep because the relative loser in 
the zero-sum game does not have an incentive to give up those unequal gains to its competitor. 
 
   
 10
UNDERLYING MOTIVATION TO GENERATE SLACK RESOURCES 
Underlying the environmental impact of varying levels of competition and the 
institutional structures that frame city decision-making is one critical motivation:  the desire to 
generate slack resources.  Research on collaboration focuses primarily on resource constraints as 
an underlying motivation.  Cities that lack sufficient resources to adequately fund the 
implementation of a program will seek out partners to share the costs.  In some circumstances, 
additional resources may mean the difference between having and not having a program at all.  
In other circumstances, additional resources may make a substantial difference in program 
effectiveness.  In still other circumstances, the program may require community-wide 
participation, as is the case with federal grants programs.   
Another underlying motivation is suggested by the traditional urban policy and 
management literature.  From the early work predicting city structure (see, for example, Dye and 
Macmanus 1976, Lineberry and Fowler 1967) to work on interlocal agreements (Morgan and 
Hirlinger 1991), economic development policy (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003, Feiock and Kim 
2000), the rise of local government political entrepreneurs (Schneider and Teske 1992), and local 
government outsourcing (Ferris and Graddy 1986, Ferris 1987), researchers have suggested that 
any number of socio-demographic characteristics of the population of a city matter in a wide 
variety of contexts.  Cities that have more severe needs are especially motivated to generate slack 
resources.  Those resources can be utilized for additional programs to at least alleviate problems 
associated with poverty. 
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RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The Political Transaction Costs of Collaboration 
As suggested earlier, the city manager function can be viewed as a mechanism for 
reducing information costs associated with policy making in a complex environment.  The 
administrative professional with less of an interest in a particular policy than with efficient 
implementation is well-suited to gather diverse opinions from a variety of stakeholders, 
assimilate that information, and provide useful policy recommendations to part-time, less 
knowledgeable (but ultimately more democratically accountable) policymakers.  The city 
manager in such a scenario would find it in his or her career interest to help policymakers find 
ways to balance competing claims and goals (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003, Feiock and Kim 
2000).  Thus, the city manager can reduce the transaction costs associated with collaboration and 
make the option more viable for cities that are motivated to collaborate. 
Although one can argue that the single-member district form of representation in cities 
encourages policymakers to be narrowly interested in the affairs of their specific district, rather 
than the city overall, policymakers elected to single-member districts learn quickly the art of 
political compromise and deal-making.  The city organization, focused on this need to create 
consensus, becomes adept at facilitating it.  Collaboration between cities requires many of the 
same sets of compromise and deal-making skills.  The organization’s ability to facilitate 
compromise in one sphere is institutionalized and carries over to other areas.  Thus, the 
institution of single-member districts in a city should reduce the transaction costs associated with 
reaching a collaboration agreement. 
Finally, the impact of non-partisan elections is indeterminate from the institutionalist 
perspective.  Are policymakers elected in a non-partisan election more likely to be supportive of 
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collaboration?  It is difficult to see why this might be the case.  Running for city council on a 
party ticket or in a non-partisan election makes little difference in helping the city reduce the 
costs of collaborating.  Thus, an institutionalist interpretation of the impact of the institution of 
non-partisan elections is that they have no effect on transaction costs associated with 
collaboration. 
The following institutional hypotheses are proposed: 
H1:  Cities with the city manager form of government are more likely to choose to collaborate 
than cities with a strong or weak mayoral form. 
H2:  Cities with a higher proportion of single-member districts are more likely to choose to 
collaborate than cities with a higher proportion of at-large districts. 
H3:  Cities with non-partisan elections are no more likely to choose to collaborate than cities 
with partisan elections. 
 
Ex Post Contract-Monitoring Sophistication 
Crucial to understanding how costly transactions can occur is the idea of ex post 
transaction costs.  All agreements require monitoring after a deal is struck.  Instrumentally 
rational actors take the cost of monitoring into account when they consider collaboration, and 
different institutional arrangements can decrease this cost for collaborators.   
While some institutional arrangements – such as the city manager form – can improve 
contract monitoring through the facilitation of information exchange between collaborators, we 
also must consider the impact of a city’s sheer ability to monitor.  With simple agreements, 
monitoring may be relatively simple and front-line administrative staff may be capable of 
handling this duty in addition to their regular functions.  However, as agreements increase in 
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complexity and number, the degree of sophistication required to monitor collaborative 
agreements increases.  Thus, cities that have more sophisticated mechanisms for monitoring 
contract compliance will be more likely to enter into collaborative transactions. 
Certainly cities with larger staffs will be better able to accommodate a marginal increase 
in workload associated with a new agreement.  But a large staff may merely reflect community 
preferences for an activist government and high levels of public goods provision.  City size, on 
the other hand, can provide a rough clue about the degree of sophistication of the city’s 
governmental organization.  Regardless of the degree of activism required of a particular 
municipal government, cities with a larger population necessarily have larger city structures than 
cities with a smaller population.  As a rough proxy for government sophistication, population 
size can be representative of the city’s ability to effectively monitor collaborative agreements.  
This discussion suggests the following hypothesis. 
H4:  Cities with a larger population can more effectively reduce the transaction costs associated 
with contract monitors and choose to collaborate more than small cities with a 
concomitantly less effective contract-compliance ability. 
 
Competition and Locational Factors 
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) argue that competition between cities biases 
behavior.  Cities that offer a similar set of alternatives find themselves in competition with one 
another for residents and employers, which translate – through a variety of mechanisms – into 
governmental resources.  Tiebout’s (1956) central argument is that this competition drives local 
governments to provide public goods efficiently.  Such competition also makes interlocal 
collaboration very difficult.  The reason is that cities that are in direct competition worry that the 
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gains to be had from collaboration will provide slack resources unequally.  This slack can then 
be used to enhance services or reduce taxes in the city that gains more from the collaboration.  
Thus, for cities that are in competition, the relative gains that each city enjoys from the 
collaboration are far more important than the absolute gains that both may receive.   
Unlike transaction costs, however, competition influences collaborative behavior not at 
the choice stage but in the second stage, when cities consider the depth of the collaboration.  The 
reason is that competition creates incentives for cities to act opportunistically.  So, when 
transaction costs are low, cities may attempt to collaborate in an effort to create more slack 
resources than its collaborator, thereby giving it an advantage in courting residents and 
employers.  We expect that competitive cities are just as likely to try to collaborate as non-
competitive ones, but the degree of collaboration will fall short in competitive situations because 
of the rareness of equal gains. 
The Tiebout Model implies that it is cities that are most alike – in terms of goods and 
services provided and tax rates – that will be most competitive.  By measuring the degree of 
overall homogeneity in the “market,” we can get a sense of the degree of competition in that 
“market.”  But what is the relevant “market” when considering the competition between cities?  
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) evaluate local government interactions in the metropolitan 
area, or what they term a “polycentric political system” (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 
831), because of the distributed nature of political authority in a metropolitan area (see Park 1997 
for a similar use of metopolitan areas).  The metropolitan area is a useful approximation of the 
marketplace for cities.   
Another way to characterize this marketplace is to say that metropolitan areas with 
smaller population dispersions are more homogenous, while metropolitan areas with higher 
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dispersions are more heterogeneous.  As Ostrom and Keohane (1995) point out, the study of 
common pool resources and international political institutions are split over the impact of 
heterogeneity of actors and its effect on successful collective action.  This study joins that debate 
and suggests a hypothesis that is similar to ones found in the international institutions literature 
that heterogeneity reduces competition, which reduces concern about relative gains, which in 
turn improves the potential for deeper collaboration. 
H5:  The greater the level of competition among cities, the lower the level of collaboration. 
One can easily imagine that size is only one of many attributes of cities that provide an 
indication of homogeneity as it impacts competition.  Competition also coincides with locational 
factors often identified in various studies of municipal governance.  Thus, it is appropriate to 
include location variables as a check against the competition hypothesis and for consistency with 
previous studies. 
Different studies have tested alternate hypotheses about the impact of city location.  
Some suggest that it is a city’s inclusion in a metropolitan area that matters most, while others 
have suggested that central cities have unique characteristics that make them more motivated to 
participate in collaborative agreements.  This suggests that: 
 H6a:  Central cities and cities outside of metropolitan areas are more likely to choose to 
collaborate. 
H6b:  Central cities and cities outside of metropolitan areas choose to collaborate to a greater 
degree. 
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Generating Slack:  Resource Constraints 
Whether one is inclined to favor a more equitable view of resource exchange relations or 
a potentially more nefarious one involving dependency between the collaborators, it safe to 
assume that cities attempt interlocal collaboration because they hope to achieve some gain from 
the interaction.  If transaction costs economics provides us with a method for understanding the 
varying impact of institutions on collaboration, then resource theories provide the governance 
equivalent of neoclassical economics.  And whether a city may be interested in relative or 
absolute gains from this exchange, the fact remains that there are some gains to be had.  We 
must, therefore, be interested in the underlying motives for collaboration, as well as the 
environmental variables that constrain that behavior.  A thorough analysis of each collaborative 
agreement would reveal what those gains are, but what broad measures exist to suggest when 
cities will, in general, be interested in gains from collaborative resource exchange? 
Existing scholarship suggests at least three factors.  First, cities that have a more 
proactive policy agenda may be more interested in collaboration.  The slack that is potentially 
generated from collaborative arrangements can be utilized for other purposes.  Cities that have a 
more aggressive agenda for the provision of goods and services to its residents would be even 
more interested in generating slack resources than other cities. 
Second, cities that have an already high tax burden would be more interested in 
generating slack that can be used to reduce the tax burden on its residents and compete more 
effectively in its “marketplace.”  Cities in otherwise comparable situations may have 
dramatically different tax burdens due to any number of reasons, including past decisions on the 
long-term financing of capital purchases, environmental or demographic particularities of the 
city, or unusually high costs of goods and services production.   
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Third, cities that receive federal funding for a variety of programs often are required as a 
stipulation of the grant that other stakeholders be involved in the administration of that grant.  
Thus, cities that receive more federal grant funding may be more likely to collaborate with other 
cities because of federal imperatives to do so.  Even when a federal grant does not require it, 
cities often work together because they know that regional solutions with significant local 
resources dedicated to the problem are often more appealing to federal grants administrators than 
solutions that are jurisdiction-bound. 
This discussion on the resource motivations that cities have for collaboration suggests the 
following hypotheses.  
 
H7a:  Cities with a more proactive policy agenda are more likely to choose to collaborate. 
H7b:  The greater the policy agenda in cities, the greater the degree of collaboration. 
H8a:  Cities with a higher tax burden are more likely to choose to collaborate.  
H8a:  The higher the tax burden in cities, the greater the degree of collaboration. 
H9a:  Cities that receive federal grants funding are more likely to choose to collaborate. 
H9b:  The greater the federal grants funding received by cities, the greater the degree of 
collaboration. 
 
Generating Slack:  Social and Economic Conditions 
While the motivation to generate slack resources whenever possible is ever present 
because of the opportunities such resources represent, that motivation may be particularly acute 
for cities that face more severe social and economic conditions.  A higher number of unemployed 
residents, a higher number of working poor, or a higher proportion of youth are just some of the 
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many examples of circumstances that may lead cities to more aggressively pursue the receipt of 
interlocal dollars.  If, through collaboration, cities with more severe socio-economic conditions 
can generate slack resources, they can make use of those resources by providing programs to 
alleviate social stress.  This suggests that: 
 
H10a:  Cities with a population with greater economic needs are more likely to choose to 
collaborate.  
H10b:  The greater the economic needs in a city, the greater the degree of collaboration. 
 
Regional Variation 
Scholars of city politics and management have found regional variations in a host of 
research domains.  Little scholarship exists to provide a rationale for why cities in some regions 
of the country might choose to collaborate more frequently or to a greater extent than cities in 
other regions.  However, to the extent that the use of differing administrative approaches diffuse 
from innovative communities to their neighbors, it is reasonable to assert that regional variation 
in the practice of collaboration may exist.   
 
H11a:  Cities in different regions of the country are more likely to choose to collaborate than 
others.  
H11b:  Cities in different regions of the country choose to collaborate to varying degrees. 
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METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
An empirical model of collaborative choice must account for both the choice of 
participation in a collaborative agreement and the degree of that collaboration.  Our model does 
this by modeling the choice to collaborate as a dichotomous (yes/no) choice in the first stage, and 
as a continuous variable for depth of collaboration, measured in dollars, at the second stage (for 
those cities that chose “yes” at the first stage). 
Running a simple regression model of the degree of collaboration is insufficient for our 
purposes for two important reasons.  The first is theoretical.  The dependent variable in the 
second stage is the degree to which a city collaborates.  In 909 cases – 32 percent of the sample – 
a city participated in no collaboration, so the value of this dependent variable is $0.  The 
theoretical model suggests that there is the possibility of a non-random selection process at work 
when cities choose not to participate or to participate at some level.  In other words, cities that 
participate in some amount of resource-sharing for collaborative purposes are theoretically 
distinct from cities that do not.  Without explicitly modeling this selection process, outcomes 
from a regression analysis of the second stage – the degree of collaboration – would be biased 
(Greene 2002). 
The second is methodological.  The data for the degree of collaboration are left-censored.  
That is, each city that opts not to participate in collaboration has a value of $0 for the degree of 
collaboration, which is equivalent to having a missing value because we do not observe the city’s 
true preference for the amount of collaboration.  Censored data are data for which we have 
observations of the independent variables but the dependent variable is unobserved or has a value 
of $0.  In such situations, ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is biased because the 
dependent variable is censored at $0. 
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For a theoretical model that suggests a two-stage empirical model and censored data, the 
Heckman procedure is recommended (1976, 1979).  The Heckman model has two equations:  the 
first – the selection equation – predicts whether an observation is censored (does a city 
collaborate or not), and the second – the outcome equation – predicts the value of the dependent 
variable of interest (degree of collaboration), given the likelihood that an observation is censored 
or observed.  The selection equation provides a measure of the risk that a city chooses to 
participate in collaboration and thus has a non-zero value in the second stage.  The inverse Mills 
ratio is a calculated value from the selection equation for each case – each city – of this selection 
risk.  It is used in the outcome equation to account for the risk introduced by the selection 
process modeled in the first equation.  See Greene (2002) for a thorough discussion.  In this 
study, both the traditional “two-step” method and the full-information maximum likelihood 
method (FIML) are utilized.  The FIML is consistent and asymptotically efficient, but more 
sensitive to model specification than the two-step method. 
 
Data and Measures 
To test this two-stage model, data were collected on cities across the country with a 
population greater than 2,000.  The U.S. Census Bureau collects and makes data available on the 
population in its decennial Census of the Population and data on local governments in its Census 
of Governments, which is conducted every five years in intervals that do not coincide with the 
Census of the Population.  The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 
conducts annual surveys of its membership in which it periodically asks for details on the form 
of government utilized in each member city.  The three sources have 2,825 cases in common 
where no data are missing. 
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The dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis – the selection stage – is 
dichotomous, representing the choice set of “participate in collaboration” or “do not participate.”  
Operationally, this variable is coded a 1 if any inter-local (city to city) revenues were recorded 
by each city in 1996 or 0 if no revenues were recorded by the city.  In the second stage of the 
analysis, the dependent variable is the amount of inter-local revenues recorded.  To control for 
the size of the city, the amount is divided by the population size to arrive at a per capita figure 
and is then logged to approximate a normal distribution for purposes of analysis1.  Data for the 
dependent variables are from the 1997 Census of Governments. 
Cities collaborate frequently, and the degree of collaboration is substantial.  
Approximately 68 percent of the cities in this study collaborate with each other, and the average 
value of that inter-local collaboration is more than $1 million.  Cities implement policy jointly in 
all areas of local services, from education and health and human services to infrastructure and 
public safety.  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 1996, the total value of inter-local 
collaboration was $3.9 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 1997).  That figure represents 3.4 percent of 
total municipal budgets for all cities that participated in some form of collaboration, and is 
almost half the size (46.5 percent) of all federal grants to those local governments. 
The measures of the institutional variables come from the 1997 ICMA Survey.  Data on 
the form of government for U.S. cities is not as readily available as one might suspect.  The 
definitive source for this information comes from the International City/County Management 
Association and is gathered annually through a survey the organization submits to its 
membership (all three portions of the form of government are not asked every year).  
                                                 
1 The Census of Governments data is provided in thousands of dollars, thus the dependent variable in the second 
stage of the model is measured in logged thousands of dollars per capita.  In the discussion section, the marginal 
effects of each statistically significant variable are reported after taking the exponent to “unlog” the data and provide 
a more intuitive description of the impacts. 
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Fortunately, the 1997 ICMA survey asked cities to provide details on these three institutions 
(ICMA 1997).  Unfortunately, the response rate for the ICMA survey is much lower than the 
response rate for the Census of Governments.  Thus, a significant limiting factor for data 
availability is the number of ICMA responses to the 1997 survey. 
To test Hypothesis 1, a city manager variable is coded as a dichotomous dummy variable 
with 1 representing cities with the city manager form of government and 0 for cities with some 
other form (almost all have the mayor-council form of government).  To test Hypothesis 2, a 
variable is constructed that measures the proportion of at-large districts in each city as a 
percentage of the total number of districts.  To test hypothesis 3, a dummy variable is coded 1 if 
partisan affiliation of the candidate is not reported on the ballot for city elections and 0 if the 
partisan affiliation is reported. 
Of the 2,825 cities in the sample, 1,568 or 56 percent have a city manager as the chief 
executive officer of the organization.  The remaining 1,257 cities have either a strong mayor or a 
commission form of government.  The cities in this sample have an average of 63 percent of the 
seats on their councils represented by at-large districts and 47 percent represented by single-
member or ward districts.  The variability of this measure is high, however, with a standard 
deviation of 43 percent and a range from 0 at-large seats to all at-large seats.  Finally, 2,114 or 75 
percent of the cities in the sample have non-partisan elections, defined as an election in which 
the partisan affiliation of the candidates is not presented on the voting ballot.  The remaining 711 
cities have partisan elections. 
In addition to the three charter-level institutions, transaction monitoring sophistication is 
expected to reduce the transaction costs associated with collaboration.  This concept is 
operationalized in this study simply as the size of the population of each city.  Data for this 
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measure come from the 2000 Census of the Population.  The 2,825 cities in this study have an 
average population of 21,268 and vary significantly in size.  The smallest cities in the study have 
a population of 2,000 while the largest city has a population of 2,895,964. 
The measure of market competition in this study is operationalized as the degree of 
homogeneity of the size of cities in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  The data come from 
the 2000 Census of the Population.  To measure the degree of competition that characterizes each 
market, the standard deviation of the populations of the cities in that MSA is divided by the total 
population of the MSA to arrive at a standardized measure of the population dispersion.  MSAs 
with smaller dispersions consist of cities that are more alike in size.  MSAs with higher 
dispersions have cities that are more dissimilar in size. 
Thus, except for non-MSA cities, the variable ranges from most likely to be competitive 
on the low end of the scale (most homogenous markets) to least likely to be competitive on the 
high end of the scale (most heterogeneous markets).  For consistency in coding with the non-
MSA cities, an inverse scale of competition is calculated for all cities in MSAs by dividing 1 by 
the competition scale.  This creates a measure of competition that goes from least competitive (0 
for non-MSA cities) to most competitive (cities in very homogenous markets).  Cities outside of 
MSAs received a value of 0 for the competition variable.  Since it is assumed that non-MSA 
cities face the least competition, the calculated competition measure for MSA cities was inverted 
to create a variable that moves monotonically from 0 for the least competition to 64.1 for the 
most amount of competition. 
Locational variables are included in the model as controls and alternative explanations to 
the market competition variable.  Cities are coded as being either a central city, a suburb within 
an MSA (the control group in this study), and cities not included in an MSA.  In the sample of 
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2,835 cities in this study, 214 or 7 percent of them are categorized as central cities.  Non-MSA 
cities number 1,149 and represent 41 percent of the sample.  Finally, suburban cities located 
within an MSA number 1,462 and represent 52 percent of the sample. 
To test Hypotheses 6a and 6b, a dummy variable for central cities was coded as a 0 for all 
cities except central cities, which were coded as a 1.  A dummy variable for cities outside of an 
MSA was coded 0 for all cities except those located outside of an MSA, which were coded with 
a 1.  The third category – non-central cities within an MSA – is the control group against which 
the other two are measured.  Data on the status of a city is available from the ICMA. 
The three variables for city expenditures, tax revenues, and federal grants come from the 
Census of Governments dataset.  Each measure is provided in thousands of 1996 dollars and is 
divided by the population to control for the size of the city and arrive at a per capita figure.  The 
expenditures variable, measured in $1,000s per capita, has a mean of .86, or the equivalent of 
$860 per capita.  It ranges from as little as $20 per person to a high of $26,860.  The tax revenues 
variable – which measures only revenue collected from the imposition of taxes, but not fees, 
fines or other miscellaneous sources of municipal revenue – has a mean of .34, or the equivalent 
of $340 per capita.  It ranges from $0 tax dollars in revenue to $4,610 per capita.  The federal 
grants variable has a much smaller mean value at .02 per capita, or the equivalent of $20 per 
capita.  It ranges from $0 for some cities to a maximum of $2,990 per capita. 
Eight variables are included in the analysis to measure the hypothesis that cities with 
greater socio-economic need will pursue collaboration in an effort to generate slack resources to 
address those needs.  Four of the variables can be characterized as demographic in nature:  
proportion of Anglos in the population, the proportion of the adult population with a college 
education, the proportion of the population under the age of 19, and the proportion of the 
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population that is 65 or older.  The other four variables measure different aspects of economic 
well-being in the community:  median home value, per capita income, the proportion of the 
population living below the poverty line, and the proportion of the working-age population that 
is unemployed.  The data come from the 2000 Census of the Population. 
As another control variable, potential regional variation in collaborative behavior is 
modeled in this study with a series of dummy variables.  The data come from regions coded by 
the ICMA in its survey of cities, and breaks out cities into the following categories:  Northeast 
(including New England and the Mid-Atlantic geographic areas), North Central (including the 
East North-Central and West North-Central geographic areas), South (including the South 
Atlantic, East South-Central, and West South-Central geographic areas), and West (including the 
Mountain and Pacific Coast geographic areas).  The North Central region is the largest in the 
sample with 1,189 or 42 percent of the cities, and is thus used as the comparison group. 
A summary of the variables used in this analysis can be found in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Results 
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, several variables are statistically significant and in the 
anticipated direction in both stages of the model.  In the selection stage of the model – choosing 
to collaborate – the city manager variable is statistically significant and in the anticipated 
positive direction for both estimators, while the at-large representation variable is in the 
anticipated negative direction but only significant in the two-step estimator.  As expected, the 
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variable for partisan elections is not significant in either estimator.  The variable measuring 
monitoring sophistication is positive and significant in both estimators. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
Tax revenue per capita, while statistically significant, is in the negative direction.  We 
anticipated that higher tax revenue would lead cities to explore alternative mechanisms for policy 
implementation that would reduce costs and allow for reductions in the tax burden on residents.  
The results of this study, however, demonstrate just the opposite – cities with high tax revenue 
are least likely to seek interlocal revenues.  Surprisingly, the socio-economic variables that most 
closely align with economic conditions – median home value, unemployment, the poverty rate, 
and median income – are not statistically significant in the selection stage of the model.   
In the second stage, the critical variable – degree of market competition – is statistically 
significant in the anticipated negative direction, indicating that as competition, measured as the 
degree of homogeneity in the market, increases, the degree of collaboration decreases.  This 
finding is consistent across both the two-step and FIML estimators.  The locational factors are 
again mostly not statistically significant, although the central city dummy variable is significant 
in the negative direction in the FIML estimator. 
Substantive interpretation of Heckman models presents some special challenges because 
the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is non-linear.  
Because some of the independent variables appear in both equations, we must account for the 
joint effect of a change in the independent has on 1) a change in the probability of selection, and 
2) a change in the expected value of the dependent variable in the outcome equation.  In addition, 
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as is often the case with maximum likelihood estimators, the value of a coefficient changes with 
changes in the value of the independent variable, which is further complicated in Heckman 
models because the value of the coefficient changes with any change in the value of the inverse 
Mills ratio in the first equation (selection risk). 
To estimate the impact of continuous variables, all other variables are held at their means 
while the model is re-estimated at substantively useful deviation from its mean.   For dummy 
variables, it is simply a matter of predicting the model with a value of 0 for the dummy variable, 
and then predicting it again with a value of 1 for the dummy variable.   A summary of the 
marginal effects of the statistically significant variables is presented in Table 6.   
 
Table 6 about here 
 
A major proposal of this study is that different institutional arrangements in cities impact 
the relative interest in participating in collaborative arrangements.  We hypothesized that the city 
manager form of government would be more likely to lead to collaborative behavior because city 
managers are more likely to limit the impact of rent seekers and find common ground among 
competitors in interlocal collaboration.  The empirical tests find relatively strong support for this.  
A city with a city manager is 5.3 percent more likely to participate in collaboration than a city 
that utilizes a different form of government.  This suggests that the presence of a city manager 
reduces the transaction costs associated with collaborative agreements. 
The proportion of at-large districts to total districts in a city, on the other hand, has a 
marginally negative effect on the choice to collaborate.  We argued that cities with a larger 
proportion of single-member districts are more adept at balancing the competing interests of 
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more narrowly focused interests endemic in such a system.  Such cities should have a better 
understanding of how to facilitate sophisticated political logrolls, and the organization’s ability 
to foster consensus on the city council can be transferred to the arena of collaborative networks.  
The results of this analysis lend equivocal support for this argument.  The variable is significant 
in the two-step estimation, but not in the more robust FIML estimate.  Based on results of the 
two-step estimate, a 10 percent increase from the mean of 63 percent in the proportion of at-large 
districts leads to a 3 percent decrease in the probability of a city choosing to collaborate. 
The robustness in this result is challenging to evaluate.  It may be that a “cut point” exists 
that sorts cities into primarily district or ward representation versus at-large representation.  If 
this cut point could be identified and a dummy variable created, perhaps a more robust finding 
would result.  However, exploration of this issue during initial phases of the analysis produced 
no intuitively obvious cut point that provided stronger results.  More work is needed to more 
adequately specify the relationship between organizational facilitation of political deal-making 
and the organization’s choice to collaborate in implementation networks. 
The third critical city charter-level institution investigated is the impact of non-partisan 
elections.  This analysis includes a dummy variable for the presence or absence of partisan 
identification in city elections because non-partisan elections are central to the reform movement 
and a critical charter-level institution.  But we anticipated that we would fail to reject the null of 
no effect from this variable in the empirical analysis.  And in fact, we were not able to reject the 
null hypothesis in either the two-step or FIML estimates.  Thus, we find that the presence or 
absence of partisan labels on election ballots has no impact on the probability of a city choosing 
to collaborate. 
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We also hypothesized that monitoring sophistication is an important non-charter 
institution that potentially can reduce transaction costs for cities considering collaboration.  As 
an initial test of this idea, we suggest that the total population size of a city is a fair proxy 
measure for a host of issues that lead a city to be characterized as “more sophisticated,” 
including larger, more well-trained, and experienced legal, financial, and audit staffs.  We 
anticipated that monitoring – while always creating a transaction cost – is relatively less costly 
for large organizations.  This lower relative cost should make large cities more interested in 
entering into collaborative agreements.  We find that in the FIML estimate, an increase in the 
population of 10,000 above the estimate average of 21,268 will lead to 1.3 percent increase in the 
probability of choosing to collaborate.  This is a particularly strong result considering that the 
cities in the analysis range in population from 2,000 to almost 2.9 million. 
The second key proposition in this study suggests that the depth of collaborative 
transactions is a function of, among other things, the degree of competition that cities face.  
Whereas the institutions of city government affect the choice of whether or not to collaborate 
presumably by altering the costs of reaching an agreement on a transaction, competition is 
hypothesized to impact the second stage of the decision process – the depth of the transaction.  
The analysis supports this hypothesis.  An increase of one standard deviation in the variable from 
its mean reduces collaboration levels by $127 per capita, which is equivalent to a $1.27 million 
reduction for a city with a population of 10,000. 
We suggest that the competition variable – focused as it is on inclusion in metropolitan 
areas – might be a theoretical foundation for previous findings that location affects collaboration.  
Generally, this argument is supported by the analysis.  In the two-step estimates, neither variable 
is statistically significant in either in the first or second stage.  However, in the first-stage FIML 
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estimate, the dummy variable for non-MSA cities is significant in the positive direction, 
indicating that non-MSA cities participate in collaboration more than suburban MSA cities.  In 
the FIML estimate of the second stage, the central city dummy variable is significant in the 
negative direction, suggesting that central cities participate in less deep collaboration, ceteris 
paribus. 
We anticipated that suburban cities would be the least likely to collaborate because they 
are the most homogenous – not only in size, but often in the mix of public goods provided – and 
are thus the most likely to be in competition with each other and most concerned about relative 
gains.  The result of the non-MSA dummy variable is consistent with this proposition, although it 
is significant only in the first stage, not the second.  However, the negative sign on the central 
city variable in the second stage is interesting and more difficult to interpret.  For example, many 
of the other significant variables – such as federal grants per capita and proportion of Anglos in 
the population – may be explaining higher collaboration rates among central cities, while the 
dummy variable is picking up residual, unmeasured factors in central cities that are unrelated to 
underlying motivations. 
Unlike OLS, maximum likelihood methods have no clear measure of explained variance 
like the R2.  A Wald test of the joint significance of the independent variables in both stages of 
the model has a χ2 value of 146.56, which is statistically significant.  An optional, but weak, 
method for evaluating the overall fit of a maximum likelihood model is the pseudo R2.  The 
pseudo R2 for the joint model is 0.025.  While this indicates a weak model overall, its value is 
difficult to assess because it is a measure of the joint log likelihood of both stages of the model.  
Another method of estimating the goodness of fit is to deconstruct the stages of the model and 
estimate each separately.  Utilizing this method, the pseudo R2 in the probit model is 0.045, 
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while the R2 in the OLS model is 0.067.  Clearly a model with higher goodness of fit measures 
would have been preferred.  However, such measures are problematic in this context.  As Long 
(1997, 102) points out, there is little “convincing evidence that selecting a model that maximizes 
the value of a given measure of fit results in a model that is optimal in any sense other than the 
model having a larger value of that measure.”  In other words, there is no benchmark against 
which to compare measures of fit from this model, and in such circumstances, the most critical 
issue is to evaluate the relevance of the independent variables and their impact on variation of the 
dependent variables. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study begins with the premise that implementing policy collaboratively is vastly 
more complicated and political than implementing policy in a traditional bureaucratic setting.  
Collaboration is political in the sense that, because there is no formal hierarchy among the 
participants, decisions about the details of how implementation will proceed are made 
collectively.  And collective choice is difficult.  It requires discussion, information gathering, and 
compromise.  Despite the costs associated with this process, cities participate in such 
collaboration at a high rate. 
We tested the effect of 20 independent variables on the probability that a city will opt to 
participate in such collaboration.  Consistent with a collective choice interpretation of the 
municipal institutions literature, we found that cities with the city manager form of government 
and with a lower proportion of at-large districts are more likely to participate in collaboration.  
Monitoring sophistication – as measured by the size of the city – is also an important indicator of 
a city’s propensity to join collaborative agreements. 
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Competition affects the degree of collaboration.  Cities in more heterogeneous markets – 
markets in which cities are relatively more alike –collaborate less deeply than cities in more 
heterogeneous markets.  This study contains two theoretically interesting aspects relative to 
competition.  First, utilization of the Tiebout model as a foundation for understanding the 
conditions under which governments will be more or less sensitive to relative or absolute gains is 
uncommon.  The majority of work spawned by the Tiebout model has focused on the degree to 
which cities actually compete or that resident-consumers act in ways consistent with the model.  
Less work has been done to explore the ramifications of Tiebout’s work if the model is correct.  
This study offers such an effort, and it finds support for the Tiebout model in the collaborative 
behavior of cities.  Second, the discussion of homogeneity and heterogeneity of markets situates 
this study in an interesting theoretical discussion between those who argue that cooperation in 
solving common pool resource problems at the local level is significantly enhanced by 
homogeneous actors and those who argue that cooperation at the international level to provide 
public goods is enhanced by heterogeneous actors (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). 
This study also has limitations.  The first challenge lies in the study’s definition of 
collaboration.  In this study, collaboration is determined by whether or not, and the degree to 
which, financial resources are received.  Thus, we focus on one particular type of collaboration – 
financial exchange.  But the literature on collaboration demonstrates that collaboration can take 
many forms, from information exchange to joint outsourcing.  The value of this more limited 
approach is that by studying collaboration involving resource exchange, we set a high standard 
for what constitutes collaboration and in so doing, eliminate cooperative efforts that do not 
require joint decision making.  Future work expanding the scope of collaborative efforts for a 
similarly large sample of collaborators would be most helpful.  While we might plausibly expect 
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that the institutional arrangements of cities would have a similar effect across different types of 
collaboration, the impact of competition may change.  Thus, it may be that the impact of 
competition is the most acute when collaboration involves resource exchange. 
A second challenge is the limitation imposed by the unit of analysis.  Collaboration in 
this study is limited to the study of cities only.  In reality, collaborative arrangements involve 
myriad actors from the governmental, non-profit, and for-profit sectors of the economy.  They 
form complex webs of relationships that facilitate information exchange, build coalitions, share 
resources, and implement policy.  This limitation is useful because cities are autonomous 
entities, and we can have some assurance that any observed joint action is truly voluntary.  And 
as a practical matter, data on non-governmental entities are rarely available.  The only data 
currently available on the collaborative efforts of non-profit and for-profit organizations comes 
in the form of case studies.   
But the limitation also has costs.  For example, our ability to generalize the findings of 
this study is limited.  The institutional arrangements in this study are specific to cities.  They may 
have little relevance to a non-profit organization considering collaboration, for example.  And 
competition between cities is rather unique in its form and degree.  One might anticipate that 
other organizations may have countervailing motivations to collaborate and compete with one 
another, but perhaps not to the extent that cities have such motivations.  Future work that 
incorporates different types of collaborators into a broad study of the type presented here could 
significantly broaden our understanding of the conditions under which institutions and 
competition matter most. 
The third challenge is rooted in the choice to study collaboration in isolation.  
Collaboration is one of many solutions to the general problem of local fragmentation in a 
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polycentric metropolitan area (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).  Other solutions may involve 
simple voluntary agreements that do not involve resource exchange or they may involve complex 
solutions that can take any number of forms, from the creation of special districts to state or 
federal redistribution of income.  This study focuses on a complex solution, but one that is 
ultimately voluntary for the participants.  A more complete theoretical model would incorporate 
an explanation of the choices along this spectrum of solutions to fragmentation. 
This study proposed a model of collaborative choice that incorporates transactions costs 
and competition explanations.  To the extent that we have been successful in this attempt, the 
conclusions we can draw from this study will help build knowledge regarding the complex 
processes of governance in the modern era. 
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 TABLE 1 - COLLABORATIVE CHOICE 
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TABLE 2 - SUMMARY OF DICHOTOMOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
Simple Dummy Variables No Yes No Yes
0 1 0 1
Has City Manager form of government 1,257 1,568 44% 56%
Has Partisan elections 2,114 711 75% 25%
Series Dummy Variables
Number Proportion
Location Relative to an MSA:
Is a Central City 214 2,825 7.6%
Is a Suburban City in an MSA  (Analysis Control Group) 1,462 51.8%
Is a city outside of an MSA 1,149 40.7%
TOTAL 2,825 100%
Location in the United States:
Northeast (New England and Mid-Atlantic) 405 2,825 14.3%
North Central (East North-Central and West North-Central)  1,189 42.1%
South (South Atlantic, East South-Central, and West South-Central) 989 35.0%
West (Mountain and Pacific Coast) 242 8.6%
2,825 100%
Number Proportion
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TABLE 3 - SUMMARY OF CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
 
No. Mean Std Dev Min Max
Continuous Institutional Variables
At-Large District Representation  (percent) 2,825 63.38 43.57 0.00 100.00
Monitoring Sophistication (population size) 2,825 21,268 72,566 2,000 2,895,964
Continuous Competition Variable
Degree of Market Competition 2,825 14.51 17.69 0.00 64.10
Continuous Slack Resource Variables
Tax Revenue Per Capita 2,825 0.34 0.29 0.00 4.61
Federal Grants Per Capita 2,825 0.02 0.08 0.00 2.99
Expenditures Per Capita 2,825 0.86 0.86 0.02 26.86
Continuous Socio-Economic Variables
Proportion of Anglos in city population 2,825 83.72 17.39 0.58 100.00
Proportion of population 65 or over 2,825 15.36 5.82 2.21 63.90
Proportion of population under 19 2,825 26.49 4.60 2.84 45.38
Proportion of adult population with college education 2,825 22.78 14.25 2.90 89.40
Median home value 2,825 116,401 95,392 21,200 1,522,001
Per capita income 2,825 22,495 12,645 6,576 157,814
Proportion of population living below the poverty line 2,825 11.68 7.42 0.37 43.56
Proportion of working age adults who are unemployed 2,825 3.47 2.11 0.00 35.47  
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TABLE 4 - RESULTS OF FIRST-STAGE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level 
** Indicates statistical significance at the .01 level 
Std. Std.
Coef. Error Coef. Error
Institutional Variables
City Manager Form + 0.145 ** 0.053 0.163 ** 0.053
At-Large District Representation - -0.001 * 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Non-Partisan Elections 0 -0.004 0.069 -0.004 0.068
Monitoring Sophistication (population size) + 0.034 ** 0.011 0.040 ** 0.011
Slack Resource Variables
Tax Revenue Per Capita + -0.662 ** 0.106 -0.688 ** 0.107
Federal Grants Per Capita + 1.784 ** 0.531 1.730 ** 0.516
Expenditures Per Capita + 0.076 ** 0.032 0.077 ** 0.031
Socio-Economic Variables
Proportion of Anglos in Population - -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.006 ** 0.002
Proportion of Population 65 Years or Older - -0.009 0.006 -0.008 0.006
Proportion of Population Under 19 + -0.044 ** 0.008 -0.043 ** 0.008
Proportion of Adults with College Education - 0.006 * 0.003 0.006 * 0.003
Median Home Value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Per Capita Income + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Proportion of Population Below Poverty Line + -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.006
Proportion of Adults Unemployed + -0.017 0.015 -0.017 0.015
Locational and Regional Variables
Central City (Yes/No) 0 0.003 0.134 -0.016 0.134
Non-MSA City (Yes/No) 0 0.109 0.067 0.114 * 0.067
Region 1 0 0.116 0.091 0.129 0.091
Region 3 0 -0.024 0.067 -0.025 0.067
Region 4 0 0.466 ** 0.106 0.466 ** 0.106
Constant 2.209 ** 0.378 2.174 ** 0.377
Inverse Mills lambda 2.603 ** 0.816 0.560 ** 0.183
Chi Square test of independent equations 5.870 **
Two-Step FIML
Hypothesized 
Direction
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TABLE 5 - RESULTS OF SECOND-STAGE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Std. Std.
Coef. Error Coef. Error
Competition Variable
Degree of Market Competition - -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.009 ** 0.003
Slack Resource Variables
Tax Revenue Per Capita + -1.486 ** 0.383 -0.738 ** 0.189
Federal Grants Per Capita + 2.082 ** 0.859 0.828 * 0.484
Expenditures Per Capita + 0.559 ** 0.085 0.478 ** 0.062
Socio-Economic Variables
Proportion of Anglos in Population - -0.022 ** 0.005 -0.014 ** 0.003
Proportion of Population 65 Years or Older - -0.010 0.013 0.000 0.009
Proportion of Population Under 19 + -0.074 ** 0.024 -0.029 ** 0.012
Proportion of Adults with College Education - 0.013 * 0.006 0.007 0.004
Median Home Value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Per Capita Income + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Proportion of Population Below Poverty Line + -0.005 0.012 -0.002 0.009
Proportion of Adults Unemployed + -0.044 0.032 -0.026 0.023
Locational and Regional Variables
Central City (Yes/No) 0 -0.039 0.254 -0.370 ** 0.159
Non-MSA City (Yes/No) 0 0.110 0.159 -0.021 0.113
Region 1 0 0.071 0.178 -0.011 0.127
Region 3 0 0.078 0.144 0.097 0.107
Region 4 0 0.823 ** 0.282 0.352 * 0.156
Constant -1.762 ** 0.867 -2.640 ** 0.586
Inverse Mills lambda 2.603 ** 0.816 0.560 ** 0.183
Chi Square test of independent equations 5.870 **
Two-Step FIML
Hypothesized 
Direction
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level 
** Indicates statistical significance at the .01 level 
 
   
 40
 
 
TABLE 6 - MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
STAGE ONE
Dependent Variable:
0 = Do Not Collaborate Leads to a Change
1 = Collaborate A change In Probability of
in X of Collaboration of
City Manager Form + A change from 0 to 1 in value of dummy variable 5.3% increase in probability
Monitoring Sophistication                
(population size) + 10,000 increase in the population 1.3% increase in probability
Tax Revenue Per Capita + $100 increase per capita 2.8% decrease in probability
Federal Grants Per Capita + $100 increase per capita 5.4% increase in probability
Expenditures Per Capita + $100 increase per capita 0.3% increase in probability
Proportion of Anglos in Population - A 10 point increase in the percent of the population 2.7% decrease in probability
Proportion of Adults with College 
Education +
A 10 point increase in the percent 
of the population 1.9% increase in probability
Proportion of Population Under 19 + A 10 point increase in the percent of the population 22.4% decrease in probability
Cities located outside of MSAs 0 A change from 0 to 1 in value of dummy variable 4.0% increase in probability
Located in Western Region             
(Mountain and Pacific Coast) 0
A change from 0 to 1 in value of 
dummy variable 14.6% increase in probability
STAGE TWO
Dependent Variable:
$ thousands per capita Leads to Change in
A change Per Capita Value of
Per Capita Average:  $48.85 in X of Collaboration of
Degree of Market Competition - An increase of one standard deviation from the mean $127 decrease per capita
Tax Revenue Per Capita + $100 increase per capita $41 decrease per capita
Federal Grants Per Capita + $100 increase per capita $40 increase per capita
Expenditures Per Capita + $100 increase per capita $69 increase per capita
Proportion of Anglos in Population - A 10 point increase in the percent of the population $40 decrease per capita
Proportion of Population Under 19 + A 10 point increase in the percent of the population $46 decrease per capita
Central Cities 0 A change from 0 to 1 in value of dummy variable $5 decrease per capita
Located in Western Region             
(Mountain and Pacific Coast) 0
A change from 0 to 1 in value of 
dummy variable $4 increase per capita
MARGINAL EFFECTS
MARGINAL EFFECTS
H
yp
ot
he
si
ze
d 
D
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ct
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n
H
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d 
D
ire
ct
io
n
Note that the marginal effects are only calculated for variables that are statistically significant in the FIML 
estimate.  
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